Please do not open a public GitHub issue. Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's Security Advisory flow:
→ Open a private advisory
(github.com/DailybotHQ/ai-diff-reviewer/security/advisories/new)
The advisory is scoped to a small circle of maintainers and lets us collaborate on the fix privately before a coordinated disclosure. You do not need special permissions to open one — any GitHub account can submit.
We aim to acknowledge within 48 hours and ship a fix or workaround within 14 days for high-severity issues. Lower-severity issues are triaged on the same schedule but may take longer to resolve.
We publish releases as SemVer git tags (vX.Y.Z) and maintain a moving
major-version alias for the current line (v2). Security fixes ship as
patch releases against the current major only; older majors are
unsupported.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
v2.x (@v2) |
✅ current major — receives security patches |
< v2.0 |
❌ unsupported — upgrade to @v2 |
For the complete trust model, supply-chain notes, secrets handling,
per-provider egress surfaces, and known accepted risks, see
docs/SECURITY.md.
Highlights covered there:
- Runtime trust boundary (composite action runs in the consumer's runner with the consumer's tokens).
- Per-provider outbound network surfaces (Anthropic API vs the agent-runner
CLIs —
claude-code,cursor,codex). - Agent-runner residual exfiltration surface (
GITHUB_TOKENpersisted byactions/checkout, vendor API key in the CLI subprocess env) — recommended hardening:persist-credentials: false+ trusted/non-fork PRs only. author-associationgate — public-repo abuse defense, default write-tier (OWNER,MEMBER,COLLABORATOR), evaluated before any LLM API call.- Log redaction (
redact_for_log+LOG_REDACT_SUBSTRINGS) and safe path resolution (safe_repo_path). - Cursor installer supply-chain note and MCP config persistence caveats.